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At their very first summit in Washington in November 2008, the G20 
leaders placed the reform of international financial regulation at the core of their 
agenda. The issue has retained a central place in discussions and communiqués at 
every subsequent meeting. It has been remarkable to see heads of state commit 
such detailed attention in their communiqués to a topic which has historically 
been the more obscure preserve of technocratic officials. Equally striking has 
been the fact that policymakers have looked beyond the immediate task of 
managing the crisis to focus on this more forward-looking agenda to prevent 
future crises. It took more than a decade after the crisis of the early 1930s for 
political leaders to agree at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference on international 
financial reforms designed to prevent a repetition of that economic calamity. This 
time around, the crisis has been used as an immediate catalyst for reform.  
But what have the G20 leaders actually accomplished so far in this field? 
There is no question that they have successfully negotiated more initiatives in this 
area than in any other, initiatives that are aimed at reforming both the content and 
the governance of international financial regulation. While the breadth of these 
reforms has been impressive, they also suffer from some important limitations. 
Despite the scale of the crisis, the reforms have been much more incremental than 
radical. Their implementation has also been slow and uneven, and some important 
issues have been neglected entirely. As we have entered a new phase of financial 
instability unleashed by the eurozone’s difficulties, these limitations have become 
increasingly evident, with political consequences that are very difficult to predict. 
 
Reforming the Content of International Financial Regulation 
  
During the several decades leading up to the global financial crisis, cooperation to 
develop international standards for prudential financial regulation grew in a 
piecemeal fashion alongside the globalization of financial markets. Standards 
were developed at different speeds in a number of distinct international standard 
setting bodies (SSBs), such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS, created in 1974), the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO, created in 1983), the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS, created in 1994), the Committee on Payments and 
Settlements Systems (CPSS, created in 1990), and the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB, created in 2001). From 1999 onwards, the G7 leaders 
also attempted to create greater coherence in the emerging international financial 
standards regime by creating a new body, the Financial Stability Forum (reborn as 
the Financial Stability Board in 2009, as noted below), to identify the most 
important standards and promote them worldwide.1  
                                                 
1
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The G20 leaders’ initiatives have been designed to address a number of 
key limitations in the international standards regime that were revealed by the 
global financial crisis that began in 2007. Some reforms have had the goal of 
strengthening existing “micro-prudential” regulations aimed at promoting the 
stability of individual financial institutions, markets and instruments. But the G20 
has also encouraged regulators and supervisors to give more attention to the 
“macro-prudential” objective of addressing wider systemic risks. Indeed, one 
of the most significant accomplishments of the G20 summits has been to build a 
new international consensus around the need to incorporate macro-prudential 
concerns into the international financial regulatory regime. The case for giving 
greater priority to macroprudential regulation was well laid out by the G20’s 
Working Group 1 in advance of the London summit in April 2009:  
 
“while each financial crisis is different, the crises over history 
generally share some key common elements including excessive risk taking, 
rapid credit growth and rising leverage. This points to the need for 
regulators, supervisors, and central bankers to supplement strong 
microprudential regulation with a macroprudential overlay to more 
effectively monitor and address the build-up of risks arising from excess 
liquidity, leverage, risk-taking and systemic concentrations that have the 
potential to cause financial instability.”2 
 
The most prominent international regulatory reform has been the 
endorsement at the November 2010 Seoul summit of a new set of international 
bank capital and liquidity standards developed by the BCBS. These standards 
updated two earlier international banking standards that had been endorsed by the 
BCBS in 1988 and 2004. This “Basel III” agreement was negotiated much more 
quickly than its two predecessors, and it signals a tightening of standards with 
respect to the quantity and quality of capital and liquidity required of banks. It 
also breaks new ground in integrating macroprudential principles into bank 
regulation through an endorsement of leverage ratios and the use of counter-
cyclical buffers that encourage banks to build up extra capital in boom times that 
can be drawn down in times of economic stress.  
The rapid negotiation of Basel III was impressive and it will improve 
banks’ resilience to financial and economic shocks. But there remain questions 
about whether the agreement will be implemented in full, particularly given high 
                                                                                                                                     
International Regulatory Change (London: Routledge 2010), Tony Porter, Globalization and 
Finance (Cambridge: Polity, 2005). 
2
 G20 Working Group 1 (2009). Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency: 
Final Report, March 25. 
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profile opposition in key jurisdictions such as the US and EU.3 Even if it is 
implemented, the agreement has some important limitations. In order to appease 
various interests, the regulators agreed that the new standards would not need to 
be fully in place until 2019. Many have also questioned whether the levels of 
required capital have been set high enough; indeed, according to Peter Boone and 
Simon Johnson, “Basel III will end up with capital requirements for systemically 
important institutions no higher than that reported by Lehman the day before it 
failed”4. In addition, the agreement continues the rely on banks’ use of internal 
risk models as well as the existing practice of classifying sovereign debt that is 
rated above double-A minus as risk free. This latter provision provides incentives 
for firms to load up on sovereign debt, thus potentially compounding the 
contagion effects of sovereign debt crises such as that which began unfolding in 
the eurozone in 2010.  
The implementation of counter-cyclical buffers has also been left 
voluntary under Basel III. Many analysts wonder whether authorities will be 
willing to take the unpopular move of raising capital requirements during boom 
times in ways that curtail lending and also may hurt the international 
competitiveness of national banks. As an interim report commissioned by the G20 
leaders noted in February 2011, “since macroprudential policy involves managing 
tail risk (the incidence of a financial crisis), the benefit of taking an action 
becomes apparent only in the long run, while the costs will often be highly visible 
and felt immediately. This may lead to a strong bias in favour of inaction. This 
bias can be further exacerbated by lobbying on the part of financial institutions 
and by other political pressures.”5  Even when authorities have decided to use 
counter-cyclical buffers, their implementation may be hindered by complicated 
voluntary reciprocity agreements that have been established for international 
banks. Under these agreements, host regulators will be reliant on home authorities 
to impose buffers on international banks calculated on the basis of a weighted 
average of a bank’s domestic and international exposures. 
A second important regulatory initiative with implications for banks has 
involved the G20’s efforts to regulate systemically-important financial 
institutions (SIFIs) more effectively. In the words of the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB), “SIFIs are financial institutions whose distress or disorderly failure, 
because of their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause 
                                                 
3
 Brooke Masters and Tom Braithwaite, “Bankers versus Basel” Financial Times, October 3, 
2011.  
4Peter Boone and Simon Johnson, “The future of banking: is more regulation needed?” Financial 
Times, April 1, 2011. 
5
 FSB, IMF, BIS, Macroprudential Policy Tools and Frameworks, Update to G20 Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors, February 14, 2011, p.11. 
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significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity.”6 As 
part of their new macroprudential regulatory agenda, the G20 leaders have set out 
to subject these institutions to tighter supervision and regulation than other 
institutions. Before the crisis, the world’s largest banks experienced the opposite 
treatment; under Basel II, they had laxer standards because of policymakers’ trust 
in the sophistication of internal risk management practices. The massive 
economic costs associated both with the collapse and/or bailouts of large 
institutions and with the broader crisis have prompted policymakers to correct this 
misplaced trust. As the G20 leaders put it at their September 2009 summit, “our 
prudential standards for systemically important institutions should be 
commensurate with the costs of their failure”.7  
This goal has been driven not just by the experience of the crisis but also 
by developments since the crisis. The bailouts, mergers and acquisitions 
associated with the crisis have created even larger and more interconnected 
financial institutions than existed before the crisis. These institutions are also 
more aware than ever that they can be backed by state support because of their 
systemically significant status. That awareness creates moral hazard problems, 
encouraging these institutions to engage in excessively risky activities. 
The G20 leaders have developed a number of initiatives vis-à-vis SIFIs. At 
their most recent summit in Cannes in November 2011, the G20 leaders endorsed 
the release of a list of 29 banks that have been designated as “global SIFIs” and 
that will be subject to “more intensive and effective supervision” as well as 
additional capital requirements from 2016 onwards. All G-SIFIs must also 
develop “recovery and resolution planning” (which includes drafting living wills 
explaining how they will be wound down in the event of trouble) and they will be 
subject to institution-specific cooperation agreements between home and host 
countries.8 The leaders also supported the creation of a new international standard 
for national resolution regimes to ensure that failing financial firms are resolved 
effectively and without costs to taxpayers.  
Although these initiatives are aimed at banks, the G20 leaders stated 
clearly that they are “prepared to identify systemically important non-bank 
financial entities”.9 They have ordered a methodology to be prepared for 
identifying systemically important non-bank entities by the end of 2012 and have 
asked insurance regulators to continue their work on a framework for supervising 
                                                 
6
 FSB, Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important Financial Institutions (Basel: Financial 
Stability Board, November 4, 2011), p.1. 
7
 G20 Leaders, Leaders Statement, The Pittsburgh Summit, September 24-5, p.9. 
8
 G20 Leaders, Cannes Summit final declaration: Building our common future: Renewed 
collective action for the benefit of all, November 4, 2011, p.6. 
9
 G20 Leaders, Communiqué: G20 Leaders Summit Cannes, 3-4 November 2011, p.3. 
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internationally active insurance groups. At the same time, they are also exploring 
how to extend these initiatives taken vis-à-vis G-SIFIs to domestic SIFIs. 
The goal of these initiatives is, in the words of the G20 leaders, “to make 
sure that no financial firm is ‘too big to fail’ and that taxpayers should not bear 
the costs of resolution”.10 Whether they succeed in meeting these ambitious goals 
remains to be seen.  
Key aspects of these initiatives cannot be implemented without significant 
legislative initiatives whose passage is far from guaranteed. As the memories of 
the crisis fade, the determination of legislators to take decisive action is waning, 
particularly when faced with increasingly bold and concerted private sector 
opposition. The historical record of international cooperation vis-à-vis 
international burden-sharing and cross-border resolution for failing international 
firms – even in a tightly integrated community such as European Union – also 
raises questions about the credibility and effectiveness of non-binding 
international agreements in this area.  
Many analysts also lament the fact that the G20 leaders did not go much 
further to endorse initiatives such as the forced breaking up of large, 
interconnected firms, or restrictions on large banks from engaging in high-risk, 
casino-like activities. At the Toronto summit in June 2010, the G20 leaders chose 
not to endorse proposals for internationally coordinated levies/taxes on the 
financial sector that were outlined in an IMF report they had commissioned to 
explore how to help pay for “any burdens associated with government 
interventions to repair the banking system”.11 Endorsing those proposals would 
have signaled a more serious commitment by G20 leaders to address the 
distributional consequences of bailouts and their social costs. It might also have 
helped address the expansion of public debt in the US and European countries, a 
phenomenon that subsequently contributed to the reemergence of global financial 
instability. At Cannes, the G20 leaders considered proposals for a financial 
transactions tax once again, but agreement remained elusive despite some high 
profile advocacy of the issue by Bill Gates and others. 
A third set of international regulatory initiatives have been driven by the 
macroprudential goal of extending regulation and oversight to cover “all 
systemically important financial institutions, instruments and markets”.12 This 
goal has provided the justification for the G20 leaders to extend regulation and 
supervision to cover institutions, such as credit rating agencies and hedge 
funds, that had previously been subject to little or very weak official oversight. 
Since poor ratings practices were widely blamed for contributing to the crisis, the 
G20 leaders committed to subject all credit rating agencies whose ratings are used 
                                                 
10
 Quotes from G20 Leaders, Cannes Summit final declaration, p.6. 
11Quote from G20 Leaders, Leaders Statement, The Pittsburgh Summit, September 24-5, p.10. 
12
 G20 Leaders, Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System, London, April 2, 2009, p.3. 
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for regulatory purposes to an oversight regime – including registration of the 
agencies – consistent with IOSCO's (previously voluntary) code of conduct. They 
have also committed more generally to reduce the reliance on credit ratings in 
prudential rules and regulations. The G20 leaders also agreed to new requirements 
that hedge funds or their managers register and disclose information to financial 
authorities. While these initiatives signaled a departure from past practice, critics 
have noted their weak nature as well as the slow pace of their implementation in 
some areas (e.g. reducing the reliance on credit ratings).  
More extensive initiatives have been launched to bring the massive over-
the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets under the official international 
regulatory umbrella for the first time. The financial crisis revealed starkly the 
vulnerability of the global financial system to a failure of a major counterparty in 
these opaque, poorly regulated markets. OTC commodity derivatives markets 
have also been widely blamed for contributing the volatility of global energy and 
food prices during 2008 and since. To address these issues, the G20 leaders have 
committed that, by the end of 2012, all “standardized” OTC derivatives contracts 
will be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, and cleared through 
regulated central counterparties (CCPs) (which reduce counterparty risks by 
serving as an intermediary between the seller and buyer). They have also insisted 
that all contracts should be reported to trade repositories and that those contracts 
not centrally cleared should be subject to higher capital requirements. In addition, 
they committed to develop global standards for CCPs and trade depositories.13 As 
part of their efforts to address commodity price volatility, the G20 leaders also 
committed at their Cannes summit to stricter regulation (including position limits) 
and supervision of commodity derivatives.14 
These various initiatives represent significant departures from past 
international regulatory and supervisory practices, and they have the potential to 
usher in what one market analyst called a new “ecosystem” for OTC derivatives.15 
But they also have some limitations. To begin with, their significance will be 
diluted if large loopholes are created through wide interpretations of key terms 
such as “standardized” contracts or “electronic trading platforms” (the latter are 
called “swap execution facilities” in US legislation). The G20 leaders have also 
refrained from restricting the use of market instruments that are widely blamed for 
contributing to destabilizing speculation, namely “naked” credit default swaps 
(CDS) which allow investors to speculate on the likelihood of default on the 
                                                 
13
 Eric Helleiner, “Reining in the Market: Global Governance and the Regulation of OTC 
Derivatives”, in Dag Harald Claes and Carl Henrik Knutsen, eds., Governing the Global Economy 
(Routledge, 2011). 
14
 G20 Leaders, Cannes Summit final declaration, p.7. 
15
 Brian Daly quoted in Jeremy Grant, “Market structures face test of trust”, Financial Times. 
November 3, 2010. 
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underlying bond without actually owning that security. Citing the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers and AIG, George Soros and others have argued forcefully that 
these “toxic” instruments encourage self-reinforcing bear raids and should be 
banned (similar to prohibitions on the purchase of insurance where there is no 
underlying interest).16 Greater efforts could also be made to constrain the market 
power of large dealer banks in the markets (including via rules about the 
ownership of CCPs, organized trading platforms, trade depositories, and data 
service providers).17 
A further limitation of derivatives reforms is that it appears quite unlikely 
that G20 countries will meet the deadlines they have committed to in this field. 
Moreover, we are already witnessing – often in response to lobbying from 
financial interests – the emergence of different priorities across jurisdictions vis-à-
vis issues such as definitions of the terms noted above, the imposition of collateral 
requirements on uncleared contracts, and the granting of exemptions from 
clearing requirements for specific products (e.g. currency derivatives) and 
institutions (e.g. end-users). Inconsistent rules between countries risk opening the 
door to competitive deregulation pressures because of the sensitivity of these 
globally integrated markets to regulatory differentials. The complex 
interconnectivity and systemic significance of OTC derivatives means that lax 
regulation in one jurisdiction could well generate financial upheavals that affect 
everyone.  
At the recent Cannes summit, the G20 leaders also endorsed tighter 
regulation and oversight of the “shadow banking system” which has reemerged, 
three years after the 2008 crisis, larger than it was before the crisis in the world’s 
largest economies.18 As they noted, “the shadow banking system can create 
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and cause the build-up of systemic risk 
outside the scope of the regulated banking sector.”19 This initiative is important, 
but it raises questions about how precautionary authorities will be in determining 
which financial activities should be considered “systematically important”. For 
example, the BIS has recommended an ambitious approach in which all new 
financial products would be registered and evaluated on an ongoing basis by a 
                                                 
16
 George Soros, “The Game Changer”, Financial Times, January 29, 2009. At the Cannes 
summit, the G20 leaders have called on IOSCO to “to assess the functioning of credit default swap 
(CDS) markets and the role of those markets in price formation of underlying assets”. G20 leaders, 
Cannes Summit final declaration, p.7. 
17
 Robert Litan, The Derivatives Dealers’ Club and Derivatives Market Reform. Initiative on 
Business and Public Policy at Brookings (Washington: Brookings, April 7, 2010); Louise Story, 
“A secretive banking elite rules trading in derivatives”, New York Times, December 12, 2010. 
18
 Brooke Masters, “Shadow banking hits new peak” Financial Times, October 27, 2011. 
19
 G20 Leaders, Cannes Summit final declaration, p.6 
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consumer financial products regulator for the systemic risks they might pose.20 
Like pharmaceutical drugs, some products could be endorsed for everyone’s use, 
others could be restricted to authorized users (or be available only in limited 
amounts to pre-screened users), while still others might be banned. The G20 
leaders show few signs of willingness to endorse or even consider this kind of 
comprehensive precautionary approach to regulation. 
Another initiative of the G20 leaders has been to develop a new set of 
international principles and standards on compensation practices for significant 
financial institutions. This initiative has clear populist appeal, but the official 
rationale for it has been a macroprudential one of restricting excessive risk taking. 
Although the new principles and standards are meant to be enforced by national 
supervisors (who could, for example, apply higher capital requirements on non-
complying institutions), the G20 leaders have been forced to recognize that 
implementation so far has been inconsistent.21 Consequently, at the Cannes 
summit, they called on the FSB to “undertake an ongoing monitoring and public 
reporting on compensation practices” and to “carry out an on-going bilateral 
complaint handling process to address level playing field concerns of individual 
firms”.22  
Two other issues on the G20 regulatory agenda deserve a brief mention: 
accounting and cross-border capital flows. At their April 2009 summit, the G20 
leaders told accounting standard setters that they should improve standards for 
the valuation of financial instruments, including in ways that might help mitigate 
the pro-cyclicality of fair value accounting. They have repeated this message at 
subsequent summits and have also called for the convergence on a single set of 
global accounting standards by the IASB and its US counterpart. Progress on 
many of these issues has been very slow. 
Although almost entirely absent from the first several G20 summits, the 
issue of regulating cross-border capital flows appeared on the Seoul summit 
agenda when the G20 leaders called for “further work on macro-prudential policy 
frameworks, including tools to mitigate the impact of excessive capital flows”.23 
A decade earlier, during the East Asian crisis of 1997-98, the IMF and many top 
G7 policymakers had been quite hostile to any efforts aiming at regulating capital 
flows. The Seoul summit’s statement signaled a greater open-mindedness to 
discuss this issue, perhaps encouraged by the broader commitment of G20 leaders 
at this time to “better reflect the perspective of emerging market economies in 
                                                 
20
 Bank for International Settlements, 79th Annual Report (Basel: Bank for International 
Settlements, June 29, 2009). 
21
 Megan Murphy, “Banks fail to trim bonuses in pay packages”, Financial Times, October 12, 
2011.  
22
 G20 Leaders, Cannes Summit final declaration, p.5. 
23
 The G20 Leaders, The G20 Seoul Summit, Leaders’ Declaration, November 11-12, 2010, p.13. 
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financial regulatory reforms”.24 From the standpoint of many developing 
countries (including many G20 members), restrictions on capital flows have an 
important role to play in macroprudential policy because financial crises in their 
countries have often been preceded by excessive capital inflows (as was also the 
case for the US in the years leading up to the subprime crisis) and/or exacerbated 
by large-scale capital flight.25  
Further evidence of the shifting international consensus on this issue came 
at the Cannes summit when G20 finance officials backed a set of non-binding 
“conclusions for the management of capital flows”. While highlighting the 
benefits of free capital movements, this statement endorsed the macroprudential 
rationale for “capital flow management measures” (including capital controls). 
But this statement was not accompanied by any significant policy initiative to 
help countries strengthen their counter-cyclical capital account regulations (e.g. 
international cooperation to encourage and strengthen national initiatives).26 
Perhaps reflecting the ongoing disagreements on the issue, the G20 leaders chose 
instead to support a quite different initiative to develop and deepen local currency 
bond markets in developing countries as a way to bolster resilience against shocks 
induced by capital flows.  
Reviewing these various initiatives as a whole, the G20 leaders certainly 
deserve applause for tackling a wide range of issues in their efforts to reform 
international financial regulation. Particularly noteworthy are their efforts to give 
greater attention to macroprudential goals. But the content of many of the reforms 
they have endorsed has been quite cautious in the context of the scale of the 
global financial crisis that began in 2007. In addition, important issues that were 
discussed in the wake of the last global financial crisis of 1997-98, such as the 
need for an international sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, have been 
entirely absent from the current G20 reform agenda – a weakness that the 
European sovereign debt crisis has exposed particularly starkly.  
Equally important, many questions remain about whether the reforms 
endorsed by the G20 will actually be fully implemented. As the outgoing FSB 
Chair Mario Draghi acknowledged just before the Cannes summit: “we have a 
long way to go to fully and consistently implement the reforms we have 
committed to and the policy measures already agreed.”27 Efforts to strengthen 
regulation within key jurisdictions such as the US and Europe are being 
                                                 
24
 Ibid, p.3. 
25
 See for example Kevin Gallagher, Stephany Griffith-Jones and José Antonio Ocampo, Capital 
Account Regulations for Stability and Development. (Boston: Frederick S.Pardee Center for the 
Study of the Longer-Range Future, November, 2011). 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Mario Draghi, “The Progress of Financial Regulatory Reforms”, October 31, 2011, p.1, 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104ff.pdf 
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challenged by opposition from increasingly assertive private financial interests as 
well as by resurgent competitive rivalries between different national financial 
systems. If national jurisdictions begin to move in different directions, 
international competitive pressures will only grow, creating opportunities for 
market actors to engage in regulatory arbitrage that will undermine the G20’s 
goals. The fact that the content of G20 communiques is often ambiguous only 
compounds the risks of significant divergences at the implementation phase.  
 
Reforming the Governance of International Financial Regulation 
 
The difficulties involved in implementing G20 commitments highlight a core 
weakness in the governance of international financial regulation. Unlike in the 
realm of international trade, there is no supranational institution to enforce 
international financial regulatory standards. The key international regulatory 
institutions have no formal power; their main roles are that of fostering networks 
of informal cooperation, information sharing and the development of international 
“soft law” whose implementation is left to the discretion of national authorities.28 
Some efforts were made by the G7 in the wake of the 1997-98 financial 
crisis to encourage greater compliance with international financial standards 
through the creation of the FSF. The body brought together in one place for the 
first time representatives of most of the key SSBs (BCBS, IAIS, IOSCO, IASB, 
and the CPSS), relevant international financial institutions (the IMF, WB, BIS, 
OECD, and the Committee on the Global Financial System), and central bank, 
finance ministry, and regulatory and supervisory authorities from each G7 country 
(along with the European Central Bank).29 As one of its first tasks, the FSF 
compiled a compendium of existing international prudential standards, from 
which it identified twelve as priority to be promoted worldwide.  The IMF and 
World Bank were then assigned the role of promoting compliance with these 
twelve standards through their Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) and 
Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs).  
But participation in the FSAP and ROSCs was entirely voluntary and there 
were no consequences for non-compliance with international standards aside from 
possible market discipline (and evidence is mixed about whether investors 
penalized countries that did not comply with - or refused to publish results of - 
their FSAPs/ROSCs). At the time of the outbreak of the recent financial crisis, a 
number of countries – including G20 countries such as the US, China, Indonesia 
                                                 
28Eric Helleiner and Stefano Pagliari, “The End of an Era in International Financial Regulation?” 
International Organization 6(2011): 169-200. 
29
 The FSF’s membership was subsequently widened to include Australia, Hong Kong, 
Netherlands, Singapore and Switzerland. For history of the FSF, see Eric Helleiner, The Financial 
Stability Board and International Standards, CIGI G20 Papers, no.1, June 2010.  
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and Argentina – had still not undergone a FSAP. And among those who had, 
compliance levels were uneven. Indeed, the fact that national financial systems 
remained regulated in quite distinct ways, despite the growth of various 
international financial standards, was brought home clearly by the crisis 
experience itself. Although the crisis was global in scope, the financial systems of 
a number of countries—including Canada, right next door to the epicenter of the 
crisis—remained relatively stable through the crisis, and this outcome was widely 
attributed to distinct national regulatory choices made before the crisis.  
Alongside their initiatives to reform international financial standards, the 
G20 leaders have set about strengthening compliance mechanisms by 
transforming the FSF into the FSB. Membership in this body has been extended to 
all G20 countries, along with selected others30, and - unlike the FSF - it comes 
with certain obligations. One is to participate in a FSAP every five years and to 
publicize the detailed IMF/WB assessments used as a basis for the ROSCs31. A 
second is to “implement international financial standards”, including new 
standards created by the FSB itself. The consequences of non-compliance, 
however, are left unspecified. Indeed, Article 16 of the FSB’s Charter 
acknowledges that the charter “is not intended to create any legal rights or 
obligations”.  
A third obligation is to participate in FSB-led peer review processes. The 
effectiveness of these processes is limited, however, by the fact that the reviews 
and their recommendations must be approved by a consensus in the Plenary 
(allowing the country being reviewed a chance to veto unwanted criticism). At the 
Cannes summit, the FSB reinforced the peer review process with the introduction 
of a new “Coordination Framework” for monitoring and public reporting of 
implementation, with special emphasis on the Basel capital and liquidity 
frameworks, OTC derivatives reforms, compensation practices, G-SIFI policies, 
resolution frameworks, and shadow banking. Again, however, this process works 
through the Plenary and its consensus decision-making rule. At this time, the FSB 
Secretariat also produced a new “status report” on the progress of implementation 
involving four grades (or “traffic lights”).32 
How effective these compliance mechanisms will be remains to be seen. It 
is striking, however, that they continue to refrain from imposing “hard law” 
obligations on countries to implement specific standards. Countries that have not 
                                                 
30
 The FSB’s membership includes the G20 along with other jurisdictions that had already become 
members of the FSF after its creation - Hong Kong, Netherlands, Singapore and Switzerland - as 
well as Spain and the European Commission. 
31
 These commitments are not in the Charter. They are contained in the January 2010 “FSB 
Framework for Strengthening Adherence to International Standards”. The Charter says only that 
members agree to “undergo periodic peer reviews, using among other evidence IMF/World Bank 
public Financial Sector Assessment Program reports.” 
32
 http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104hh.pdf. 
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yet fully implemented even the Basel II bank standards – which includes six 
members of the BCBS, including the US and China33 – face no formal 
consequences beyond exhortations in G20 summit communiqués that they do so. 
A number of analysts have been calling for some time for a stronger treaty-based 
international body that could act as an equivalent to the WTO in the financial 
regulatory sphere, with the power to sanction members whose regulatory policies 
did not meet minimum international standards.34 This financial crisis has not acted 
as a catalyst for this reform; instead, compliance mechanisms have been 
strengthened in a much more limited manner, building on the FSF experience. 
One partial exception to this pattern has been the FSB’s recent campaign – 
strongly backed by the G20 leaders – to encouraging worldwide compliance with 
some basic international cooperation and information exchange standards 
embodied in BCBS, IAIS and IOSCO principles. After evaluating compliance in 
61 jurisdictions, the FSB published a list of “non-cooperative jurisdictions” 
(NCJs) right before the Cannes summit, which included just Libya (the former 
regime) and Venezuela, both of which were described as “not engaged in dialogue 
with the FSB”. In addition to being named-and-shamed in this way, these and 
other future non-cooperative jurisdictions have been warned by the G20 leaders 
with the following: “We stand ready, if needed, to use our existing 
countermeasures to deal with jurisdictions which fail to meet these standards.”35 
Past statements suggest that these countermeasures could include denying market 
access to FSB members’ financial markets. 
Initiatives of this kind by the FSB raise questions about the legitimacy and 
accountability of the organization. The FSB’s membership is wider than that of 
the FSF but it is still very restrictive in comparison with the WTO or IMF. The 
same is true of key SSBs such as BCBS whose standards are being promoted.36 
The more that the FSB takes on a mission of promoting worldwide compliance 
with international financial standards, the more likely it is that non-members will 
                                                 
33
 Brooke Masters, “Countries fail to enact Basel bank reforms”, Financial Times, October 19, 
2011. 
34
 See for example Barry Eichengreen, Out of the Box Thoughts about the International Financial 
Architecture. IMF Working Paper. No. 09/116. (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 
2009), and John Eatwell and Lance Taylor, Global Finance at Risk (New York: New Press, 2001). 
35
 G20 Leaders, Cannes Summit final declaration, p.8. 
36
 Before the first G20 leaders summit, the BCBS membership included the G7 countries plus 
Benelux, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. It then expanded its membership in 2009 to include all 
G20 countries, Hong Kong SAR and Singapore. IOSCO and IAIS have long had much wider 
memberships, but IOSCO’s Technical Committee, which plays the key role in developing 
standards, is much narrower. In 2009, it added Brazil, India and China to its existing membership 
of the G7 countries, Australia, Hong Kong, Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland. The 
CPSS’s membership also expanded at this time from including just the G7 countries, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Singapore, Hong Kong, Sweden and Switzerland, to welcome Australia, Brazil, 
China, India, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and South Korea. 
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challenge its legitimacy to do so.  Compliance with international standards among 
the many non-members of the FSB (and other international standard setting 
bodies) would be strengthened by providing them with more voice.  
To try to address this issue, the FSB has created six regional consultative 
groups covering the Americas, Asia, the Commonwealth of Independent States, 
Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Invitations to 
approximately 70 non-members of the FSB have been extended to join these 
groups. Each group is comprised of both members and non-members of the FSB, 
and is designed to encourage a sharing of views between non-members and the 
FSB. But the usefulness of this initiative is limited by the fact that non-members 
remain as “rule-takers” without a formal say in FSB proceedings, while they are 
asked to take on many of the obligations of FSB membership (such as 
implementing international financial standards and undergoing FSAPs).37 These 
measures are very unlikely to address the concerns about the legitimacy of 
narrowly-constituted FSB to set worldwide rules and endorse countermeasures 
against those who do not comply. A more ambitious strategy would be to widen 
the membership of the FSB and use the regional groups to provide a formal voice 
into the FSB’s decision making, perhaps through a constituency system like that 
used in the IMF.  
The FSB’s capacity to encourage compliance also depends in part on its 
legitimacy and accountability to the member countries. The effectiveness of 
its peer review mechanisms, in particular, will be influenced by the degree of 
commitment that member countries have to the FSB and its goals. One key task is 
to strengthen the “buy-in” of developing countries that were not previously 
members of the FSF (and some of the key international standard setting bodies). 
Many of these countries have distinct perspectives on international regulatory 
issues because of development goals and/or the nature of their financial structures, 
but the focus of post-crisis international regulatory discussions has initially been 
focused mainly on the problems of developed countries (where the crisis began). 
It is encouraging that the November 2010 G20 summit mandated the IMF, World 
Bank and FSB to report on financial stability issues of particular interest to 
emerging market and developing economies. At the Cannes summit a year later, 
the G20 leaders followed this with a call for “international bodies to take into 
account emerging market and developing economies’ specific considerations and 
concerns in designing new international financial standards and policies where 
appropriate.”38 Greater efforts should also be made to strengthen the voice of 
these countries within the FSB’s various working groups and committees, 
                                                 
37
 Domenico Lombardi, The Governance of the Financial Stability Board: Issues Paper. 
(Washington, Brookings, 2011), p.22. 
38
 G20 Leaders, Cannes Summit final declaration, p.7. 
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particularly the all-important Steering Committee (which provides operational 
guidance between biannual plenary meetings of the entire membership). 
The composition of the Steering Committee is also relevant to securing 
greater “buy-in” of many developed country governments. In its initial two years, 
the FSB’s Steering Committee has been dominated by central bankers. 
Representatives of finance ministries have been much less prominent despite the 
fact that they have a critical role to play in steering the kinds of national 
legislative initiatives that are required to implement reforms endorsed by the FSB.  
At the Cannes summit, the G20 leaders acknowledged this limitation and backed 
reforms to address this and the need for greater geographical diversity: “as we 
move into a phase of policy development and implementation that in many cases 
will require significant legislative changes, we agree that the upcoming changes to 
the FSB steering committee should include the executive branch of governments 
of the G20 Chair and the larger financial systems as well as the geographic 
regions and financial centers not currently represented, in a balanced manner 
consistent with the FSB Charter”.39 
For the FSB to play a significant role in the governance of international 
financial regulation, the G20 leaders also agreed at Cannes to strengthen its 
institutional standing. Despite being assigned a more ambitious mandate than 
the FSF, the FSB has been severely constrained by having less than two dozen 
staff members (the IMF has approximately 2400), all of whom have been 
seconded from other organizations for relatively short durations of time because 
the FSB lacks formal legal status. The FSB needs a stronger and more permanent 
secretariat not just to fulfill the various tasks that the G20 leaders have given it 
but also to enable the institution to develop independent analytical capacity and to 
help integrate the insights and activities of the many organizations that comprise 
the body.  At the Cannes summit, the G20 leaders have moved a step in the right 
direction by asking the FSB Chair to explore how to provide the organization 
“with legal personality and greater financial autonomy”.40  
At this time, the G20 leaders also called for “the strengthening of its [the 
FSB’s] coordination role vis-à-vis other standard setting bodies (SSB) on 
policy development and implementation monitoring, avoiding any functional 
overlaps and recognizing the independence of the SSBs.”41 This recommendation 
highlights the important role that the FSB can play in encouraging a more 
integrated view of prudential issues among the patchwork of international SSBs 
that have emerged since the 1970s. The sector-specific nature of each SSBs (i.e. 
separate organizations for banking, securities, insurance etc.) inhibits each from 
                                                 
39
 Ibid, p.9. 
40
 Ibid, p.9. 
41
 Ibid, p.9. 
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recognizing the interconnections between sectors and identifying broader 
macroprudential issues relating to systemic risks. 
The goal of creating greater coherence in international regulatory 
governance had been one of the purposes behind the 1999 decision to create the 
FSF and to include the key SSBs as members.42 Ten years later, when designing 
the FSB, the G20 leaders gave the new body a more explicit mandate in this area. 
The FSB’s charter empowers it to conduct “joint strategic reviews of the policy 
development work of the international standard setting bodies” and “promote and 
help coordinate the alignment of the activities of the SSBs”. The standard setting 
bodies are also now required to report to the FSB on their work in order to 
provide “a broader accountability framework” for their activities (although the 
FSB Charter also notes that “this process should not undermine the independence 
of the standard setting process”).43 Unlike the FSF, the FSB has also been given 
the ability to create its own standards rather than relying entirely on the SSBs. 
These new mandates have created a much closer working relationship 
between the FSB and SSBs, and one in which the FSB (and the G20 leaders 
forum behind it) has assumed much more of a leadership role than the FSF ever 
did. The SSBs have also recognized the FSB’s usefulness in encouraging the 
dissemination and implementation of their standards (and they are participating 
directly in its efforts to encourage compliance vis-à-vis NCJs). But there remain 
questions about the FSB’s capacity to provide leadership because the SSBs’ 
independence is explicitly defended in the FSB’s Charter. This issue has been 
particularly salient vis-à-vis the IASB which has been slow to implement some 
aspects of the G20-led post-crisis reform agenda.44 
Summing up, there is no question that the creation of the FSB has 
strengthened the governance of international financial regulation. But like the 
specific content of regulatory reforms discussed in the first half of this article, this 
institutional innovation has been an incremental change rather than a radical one. 
The FSB builds on the FSF experience in some significant ways, but it remains a 
network-based organization with little formal power and limited staff and 
capacity. Its establishment is very far from representing the kind of dramatic 
                                                 
42
 Hans Tietmeyer  “Report by the President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Prof Hans Tietmeyer, 
on 11/02/99,” BIS Review. 21(1999) 1-6. 
43
 Quotes from FSB Charter: http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_090925d.pdf 
44
 At their first summit meeting, the G20 leaders asked the IASB – which was then a strictly 
private body – to review its membership “in particular in order to ensure transparency, 
accountability, and an appropriate relationship between this independent body and the relevant 
authorities.” In January 2009, the IASB created an international monitoring board to appoint the 
trustees who oversee its operations and whose members include the US SEC, Japan’s FSA, the 
European Commission, and IOSCO’s Emerging Markets and Technical Committees (as well as 
the BCBS as an observer). Since then, the G20 has continued to welcome further reforms to its 
governance.   
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change that the 1995 creation of the WTO represented in the trade realm. Instead, 
as Louis Pauly has argued, it looks more like a kind of “historical reversion” from 
the Bretton Woods model of global financial governance involving legal 
commitments and significant supranational institutions to the weaker and less 
effective informal model of the League of Nations’ core economic and financial 
machinery.45 Even if the FSB is granted formal legal standing, this is very 
unlikely to be via an international treaty. Instead, FSB members are discussing the 
much more limited step of simply making it a corporate entity registered in a 
specific country’s domestic law. 
It is possible that the FSB might evolve over time into a more powerful 
supranational body helping to enforce detailed international financial standards. 
But the crisis has presented a number of new challenges in the way of this goal.46 
By politicizing financial regulatory issues at the domestic level, the crisis has 
eroded the considerable autonomy that regulators had before the crisis to 
negotiate international standards and has heightened concerns in some domestic 
quarters about delegating regulatory decision-making to international bodies. 
Consensus building around new detailed standards has also been complicated by 
the widening of the membership of various international standard setting bodies 
and the blow to the reputation of Anglo-American regulatory models (which had 
acted as a focal point for many pre-crisis international standards).  In addition, the 
failure of many international financial standards to address causes of the crisis has 
generated more jaded perspectives on the value of international regulatory 
harmonization. The new post-crisis consensus in favour of macroprudential 
regulation has also reinforced the case against detailed regulatory harmonization 
by endorsing greater use of judgment and discretion by national authorities to 
contain systemic risks.  
We live in an historical moment, in other words, when the delegation of 
power to a supranational authority tasked with harmonizing financial regulation 
worldwide faces heightened political obstacles. Indeed, if there is a radical change 
to the governance of international financial regulation, it could well be in the 
opposite direction towards a more decentralized order. If the incremental nature of 
international regulatory reform failed to prevent another major global financial 
crisis, national policymakers might well be prompted to introduce more 
restrictions on cross-border financial activity and shift towards greater reliance on 
host country regulation in which international banks were required to established 
separately capitalized local subsidiaries in each country (particularly if national 
taxpayers are revealed to be once again the ultimate backstop of institutions 
                                                 
45
 Louis Pauly, “The Financial Stability Board in Context”. In S. Griffith-Jones, Eric Helleiner and 
Ngaire Woods, eds., The Financial Stability Board (Waterloo: Centre for International 
Governance Innovation), p.15. 
46
 For more detailed discussion of this theme, see Helleiner and Pagliari, “The end of an era?” 
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operating in the territory). In a context of global financial turmoil, the attraction of 
these policies might be that they offer greater protection against unstable global 
markets and poor regulation abroad as well as enabling national autonomy to be 
boosted in ways that allow the pursuit of more ambitious regulatory initiatives at 
home.47  
The move towards a more segmented, decentralized international 
regulatory order of this kind could unfold in either a cooperative or non-
cooperative manner. The FSB could play an important role in encouraging the 
former. Under this scenario, national authorities would turn away from the 
negotiation of detailed harmonized international standards, but they would still 
benefit from collective commitments to some kinds of international broad 
minimum standards vis-a-vis sectors and market infrastructure where financial 
upheavals abroad are more likely to spill over into domestic financial systems. In 
a more decentralized order, international cooperation could also strengthen 
national authorities’ ability to regulate domestically through information sharing, 
research collaboration, early warning systems, and capacity building. By fostering 
these kinds of cooperation, the FSB would be focused on the goal of 
strengthening the capacity of states to regulate finance within their borders rather 
than serving as some kind of stepping stone to the construction of supranational 
body enforcing globally harmonized regulations that superseded national ones.48 
 
Conclusion 
 
What have the G20 leaders accomplished in the international financial regulatory 
sphere to date? There is a strange dichotomy of views on this question. Some - 
particularly insiders - highlight the successes, arguing that the G20 leaders should 
be applauded for agreeing to more extensive initiatives in this area than in any 
other. It is certainly true that they have negotiated a striking number of reforms 
that address weaknesses in the content of pre-crisis regulation both at the micro 
and macroprudential level, and across a wide range of issues (banking, SIFIs, 
credit rating agencies, hedge funds, derivatives, shadow banking, compensation, 
accounting, and cross-border capital flows). They have also brought a new 
international organization – the FSB – into existence that is helping to strengthen 
                                                 
47
 For the benefits of host country regulation, see Markus Brunnermeier, Andrew Crockett, 
Charles Goodhart, Avinash Persaud, and Hyun Shin. The Fundamental Principles of Financial 
Regulation (Geneva: ICMB-CEPR, 2009), Avinash Persaud, “The Locus of Financial Regulation: 
Home vs Host” International Affairs 86(3)(2010): 637-46. See also Dani Rodrik, “A Plan B for 
Global Finance,” The Economist. March 12, 2009; The Warwick Commission on International 
Financial Reform: In Praise of Unlevel Playing Fields. (Coventry: University of Warwick, 2009). 
48
 Helleiner and Pagliari, “The end of an era”; Eric Helleiner“What Role for the New Financial 
Stability Board? The Politics of International Standards After the Crisis” Global Policy 
1(3)(2010): 282-90. 
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the governance of international financial regulation. The consistent focus that the 
G20 leaders have given to these often obscure and highly technical regulatory 
issues has been impressive and the speed with which reforms have been 
negotiated has often been unprecedented. 
Despite these achievements, there is an increasingly widespread sense of 
disappointment among outside analysts and general public with the results of the 
international regulatory reform process. The incremental nature of many of the 
reforms has struck many observers as an inadequate response to the problems 
revealed by the severity of the global financial crisis. Growing questions have 
also been asked about the extent to which the commitments made at the G20 
summits will actually be implemented at the national and regional levels, 
questions that have been reinforced by the FSB’s lack of teeth. As private 
financial actors resume pre-crisis patterns of risky behaviour, it is not surprising 
that questions are being asked about how much the world has actually changed. 
As the new head of the FSB, Mark Carney, acknowledged, “There’s a frustration 
with policy and a frustration that, ‘are things going back to business as usual,’”. 
He added: “If I may say, that is not going to happen, but I can understand the 
frustrations.” 49  
Doubts about the G20’s accomplishments in this field have been only 
reinforced by the renewed global financial turmoil that has been generated by the 
eurozone troubles. It is far from clear that the thousands of hours of work that 
have gone into post-crisis G20-led regulatory reforms have made the global 
financial system much safer from the kind of instability we are now facing. The 
eurozone crisis has also highlighted starkly the costs of the G20’s neglect of 
important issues, such as the need for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism 
that was described a decade ago by Anne Krueger, then-IMF’s Deputy Managing 
Director, as a “gaping hole” in the governance of international finance.50  
If the current instability spills over into a major global crisis of the kind 
experienced in the fall of 2008, what will be the consequences for international 
regulatory reform process? On the one hand, it could generate new political 
momentum for a more ambitious, and less incremental, approach to international 
regulatory reform than G20 policymakers have yet been willing to embrace. The 
Mexican Presidency of the G20 in 2012 could play an important role in 
mobilizing support around a vision of this kind. That vision could address many, 
                                                 
49
 Quoted in Jeremy Torobin, “Bank of Canada head calls Occupy protests 'entirely constructive'”, 
The Globe and Mail, October 14, 2011. The G20 leaders also felt compelled to declare somewhat 
defensively at Cannes: “We will not allow a return to pre-crisis behaviours in the financial sector”. 
50
 Quoted in Eric Helleiner, “Filling a Hole in Global Financial Governance? The Politics of 
Regulating Sovereign Bond Restructuring” in W.Mattli and N.Woods, eds., The Politics of Global 
Regulation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
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if not all, of the weaknesses in the post-2008 reform initiatives noted above 
relating both to the content and governance of international financial regulation. 
On the other hand, another major financial crisis could well discredit the 
goal of international regulatory harmonization and encourage the emergence of a 
more decentralized pattern of distinct and somewhat segmented regional and 
national regulatory regimes. Once again, the Mexican G20 Presidency would have 
an opportunity to play a key leadership role in this scenario. In this case, its task 
would be to steer centrifugal political pressures in a cooperative direction. If this 
decentralizing scenario did unfold in a cooperative manner (with the help of the 
FSB as noted above), it could well generate a more stable global financial system 
than what we have experienced over the past few decades.51  
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 Rodrik, “A Plan B”. 
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